Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1970

Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, The Denver And Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, And Union Pacific Railroad
Company : Brief of Appellant Union Pacific Railroad Company

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.A.U. Miner, D.A. Bybee, N.W. Kettner, S.A. Goodsell, J.C.
Wiliams; Attorneys for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Ewell & Son v. Salt Lake City Corp., No. 12166 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5307

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

1

'

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EWELL & SON•, INC., a corporation,
P/,ai,ntiff-Bespcmilent,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,
Case No.
THE DENVER AND RIO
12166
GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-.A.ppeUant,
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-.A. ppellant.

Brief of Appellant,
Union Pacific Railroad Company

J...,....

Appeal by Union Pacific Railroad Company, Defe1Ulant-A119eilant, from a Judgment on Jury. Verdict an4 Amended
Entered by the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, a..
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge Presiding, in ·Favor el Bwell
& Son, Inc., a corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent.
llEED L. MARTINEAU
Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent
701 Continental Bank Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah
JACK L. CRELLIN
Counsel for Defendant-Respondent,
Salt Lake City Corporation,
101 City & County Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
&McCARTHY
Counsel
for Defendant-Appellant
The Denver
and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company
141 East 1st South Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah

L

A.U.MINER
D.A.BYBEE
N.W.KETTNER
S. A. GOODSELL
J.C. WILLIAJIS
Counsel lor UDiOll. Pama.t
Railroad CompanJ",
·
Defendant-AppeU.nt
10 South Main Street.
Salt Lake City, Utah

F' L ED
0 CT 8 - '1970

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I

Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE ................................................ 1
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT .... 2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL .................... 3
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................. 4
i\.RGUMENT ............................................................ 9
STATEMENT ...................... 9
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 34

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT
WITH SLC PRECLUDES RECOVERY
UP FOR ANY DAMAGE OCCASIONED BY DELAY IN LOCATING
AND PROTECTING CABLES .................. 10
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REMOVE FROM JURY CONSIDERATION THE ISSUE OF EXPRESS CONTRACT BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND UP AFTER PLAIN TIFF DENIED FORMATION OF AN
EXPRESS AGREEMENT .......................... 14
1

Page
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING OVER OBJECTION INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE CONCERNING
THE MATERIAL FACTS IN ISSUE .... 16

POINT IV. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS BOTH CONSIDERED AS A
WHOLE AND SEPARATELY PRECLUDED A FAIR TRIAL AND VERDICT ....................................................................
POINT V. THE ALLEGED CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND UP IS
VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY ..
POINT VI. THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION MOVING TO UP FROM PLAINTIFF SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE ALLEGED CONTRACT ....................
POINT VII. THE JURY'S AWARD OF
DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF BOTH
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND
FOR DELAY GIVES PLAINTIFF UNJUSTIFIABLE DOUBLE RECOVERY ..
POINT VIII. AFTER ELIMINATION OF
INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE AND
THE DELAY CLAIMS, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ANY JUDGMENT AGAINST UP
INDEX OF CASES AND
AUTHORITIES CITED

21

23

27

29

31

Cases
Allen vs. Eissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539.... H
Baugh vs. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335 ............ 29
11

Page
Beaver County vs. Home Indemnity Company, 88
Utah 1, 52 P.2d 435 ·········----------·························
26
Benson vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P.2d 790 .............. 15
Builders Supply Company vs. City of Helena, Montana, 154 P .2d 270 ................................................ 26
Bunnell vs. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 ........ 14
Campbell Building Company vs. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P.2d 857 .................... 24
Continental Bank & 'Trust Company vs. Stewart,
4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 .......................... 13, 28
Farmers & .Merchants Savings Bank vs. Jensen, 64
Utah 609, 232 P. 1084 ··········-·······--················--··
19
Greenberg vs. Burnstein, (Mo. App.) 347 S.,V.2d
244 ················---···········-········---·························-··---19
Huber & Rowland Construction Company vs. City
of South Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 273, 323 P .2d
258 ------······-·······-------·-----------······-----------··················
25
Kimball Elevator vs. Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah
2d 289, 272 P.2d 583 -----·······-················-········-··-··
19
Lundt vs. Parsons Construction Co., 181 N eh. 609,
150 N.W.2d 108 ·············------···········-············---12,
28
U. H. \V alker Realty Company vs. American Surety
Company of New York, 60 Utah 435, 2ll P.
998 ········································-·······-···-·-····-·········-13,
28
McCollum vs. Clothier, 121 Utah 3ll, 241 P.2d
468 ·················-···········--···········--------············--------31,
33
Oman Construction Company vs. 'Tennessee Central
Railway Company, ('Tenn.), 370 S.W.2d
563 ·····························-···-··························-······-13,
28
111

Page
Peerless Manufacturing Company vs. Gates,
(Minn.), 63 N.W. 260 ........................................ 18

Provo City vs. Tl:w Department of Business Regulation, 118 Utah l, 218 P.2d 675 ............................ 23

Smith vs. Brown, 50 Utah 27, 165 ...P. 468 .................. 29
True Oil Company vs. Gibson, (Wyo.) , 392 P .2d
795 ······························································
18
Van Tassell vs. Lewis, 118 Utah 356, 222 P.2d 350 .... 29
'Vestern Engineers vs. State Road Commission, 20
Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d 216 ............................ 20, 29
'Vheeler vs. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland,
8th Circuit, 63 F.2d 562 ...................................... 15
Statutes
10-7-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 .................... 23, 24
54-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ........................ 22
56-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 .......................... 22
54-4-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ........................ 22
'
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
··················
3
Rule 50 (b) ·································
···············
Rule 59 .......................................................................... 3

lV

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E'VELL & SONI, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORAT I 0 N, a corpora tion,
Defendant-Respondent,
THE DENVER AND RIO
GRANDE 'VESTERN RAILROAD
COMP ANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,

Case No.
12166

lTNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COl\IPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

Brief of Appellant,
Union Pacific Railroad Company

STATE1\1ENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages in the alternative from Salt Lake City Corporation (hereinafter
1

referred to as SLC) or from The Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company (hereinafter re·
ferred to as D&RGW) for alleged breach of separate
written agreements between plaintiff and SLC and be.
tween plaintiff and D&RG W; and additionally to recover damages for breach of an alleged oral agreement
either express or implied in fact between plaintiff, D&RGW and Union Pacific Railroad Company (hereinafter referred to UP) or, in the alternative, for the reasonable value of work performed under quantum mer·
uit; and additionally to recover damages for alleged unreasonable delay allegedly caused by D&RGW and UP;
all of which arose from the construction work done by
plaintiff in replacing that portion of sanitary sewer ex·
tension 933 owned by SLC running longitudinally on
9th South Street between Richards Street and 6th West
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After denying the respective motions of each de·
fendant for involuntary dismissal and for a directed
verdict, the trial court submitted all issues to a jury on
separate general verdicts for and against each defend·
ant. The jury returned a verdict against plaintiff and
for SLC, no cause of action, a verdict for plaintiff and
against D&RGW in the sum of $14,101.83, and aver·
diet for plaintiff and against UP in the sum of $6,508.42.
Motions of UP to set aside the verdict and enter judg·
2

ment in accordance with UP's motion for a directed
rerdict under Rule 50 (b), U.R.C.P., or in the alternative for a new trial under Rule 59, U.R.C.P., were denied ..Motions of D&RGW for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a new trial and to amend the judgment were likewise denied. The clerk entered judgment
initially upon the verdicts as returned by the jury, and
the court subsequently entered an amended judgment to
add interest to the judgment against D&RG'V from
December IO, 1965 to May 19, 1970, in the sum of
$3,757.65 and to add interest for a like period to the
judgment against UP in the sum of $1, 734.38 making a
total judgment against D&RGW of $17,859.48 and a
total judgment against UP of $8,242.80.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and appellant UP seeks (a) reversal of
the judgment entered against it and in favor of plaintiff and (b) direction of entry of judgment in favor of
UP and against plaintiff on all issues in this lawsuit, or
(c) failing ( b) above, either in whole or in part, that a
new trial be granted UP on those issues, if any there
be, that the court determines cannot be resolved in favor
of UP as a matter of law, or (d), failing (a), (b) and
(c), that the court modify the judgment entered in
favor of plaintiff and against UP by striking therefrom
all items of damage attributable to claims for delay and
the interest relating thereto.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arose from a series of events which took
place in the last half of the year I965 when SLC undertook the construction of sanitary sewer extension No.
933. Said sewer extension was to be laid longitudinally
in 9th South Street in such manner as to cross at right
angles (or at nearly right angles) thirteen sets of rail·
road tracks, six sets of which were UP tracks and seven
sets were D&RGW tracks. (Exhibit 22-D)
Preliminary advice of the proposed extension was
given by SLC's Engineer to UP on July 26, I965, by
letter in which the City Engineer stated: "I would ap·
preciate your approval of these plans as they affect your
(UP' s) requirements, or suggestions. Also, a statement
of your (UP's) requirements concerning liability in·
surance carried by the construction contractor, said requirements to be included in the contractual documents
entered into by the contractor with the city." (Exhibit
2-P) (Emphasis added.) UP responded to this request
by letter dated July 28, I965, giving suggestions and
approval of the proposal if so modified in accordance
with those suggestions. (Exhibit I I-P) UP's sugges·
tions as to the size and length of the pipe casing were
without further correspondence incorporated into SLC's
contract documents. (Exhibit I-P)
On September 2I, I965 SLC again wrote UP ad·
vising that it planned to open cut at the railroad cross·
ings and that it would expect UP to underpin and pro·
tect its tracks at UP expense but that it would "instruct
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the contractor to cooperate in every way to make these
crossings with dispatch and safety." (Exhibit 7-P) SLC
then on October 5 asked for bids on the sewer extension,
and pursuant to its advertisement, four bids were received and opened in City Commission meeting on October 20, 1965. (Exhibits 1-P, 10-P) Plaintiff's bid was
slightly in excess of $119,000, the next lowest bid was
slightly under $128,000, and the other two bids were
slightly over $166,000 and $198,000 respectively. Over
the objections of UP and D&RGW, SLC Commissioner Catmull was allowed to relate a conversation with
plaintiff together with an announcement he made at the
bid opening, each to the effect that the bid was only for
city work and that the contractor would have to make
his own arrangements with the railroads to pay any extra
expense that was caused by going underneath the railroad tracks. (R 868-872) Catmull privately made a similar statement to one other potential bidder prior to the
bid opening date. (R 878) The statement made at the
time of the bid opening did not have any effect upon the
bids made because all were in the custody of the City in
sealed envelopes prior to the announcement made at the
bid opening. (R 535, 880, 881) Neither of these statements were made to, or in the presence of, any railroad
representatives. (R 868, 871)
After the bids had been opened, two meetings were
held in the office of SLC's Engineer. The first of these
was held on October 21, 1965 and was attended by representatives of the legal and operating departments of UP
and D&RG W, and legal and engineering representa5

tives of SLC. (R 894, 357, 420, 740, 780, 799) Although
there was some testimony that Mr. Larkin was present
from UP, (R 894, Exhibit 14-P), the identification of
Mr. Larkin as being in atendance was clearly based on
faulty memory and/or identification (R 899, 910), and
the persons attending from UP were Mr. A. U. Miner
and Mr. lH. W. Gustin. (R 740, 765, 766, 780, 799)
Attending from D&RGW were R. Oatman and S. N.
Cornwall. (R 740, 780, 799) Relative rights and respon·
sibilities of the City and the railroads were discussed at
this meeting, but no agreement was made except insofar
as UP may have agreed to accept a responsibility to take
out its tracks and replace them following the laying of
the sewer pipe. (R 897, 898, 801) Over the objection of
UP and D&RGW, Mr. Holmgren was allowed to state
that when representatives of D&RG'V and UP left,
they were going to contact the contractor for the purpose of coming to an agreement with him. (R 897) A
meeting was held the next day, October 22, 1965, with
engineering representatives of UP, of D&RG,V, of
SLC, and plaintiff in attendance. It was at this meeting that the acts occurred which plaintiff claims gave
rise to an express or implied contract with it to pay for
the "extra work" alleged in its amended complaint for
open cutting six UP crossings and four D&RGW crossings. The record of this meeting as testified to by the
parties who were there present is found in the following
portions of the record on this appeal :

6

Harold S. Carter, R 910-920, 304-305, 319-324
Joseph F. Fenton, R 355-367, 370-377
\Villiam D. Keyting, R 420-442, 454-455
Byran Ewell, R 466-470, 480-482, 529, 535-537,
543-548, 564-569, 572-573

Robert Oatman, R 739-747, 765-769
Myron W. Gustin, R 780-786, 794-797
This testimony is too lengthy to repeat verbatim in this
brief although portions thereof will hereafter be quoted
in argument. In UP' s opinion, a fair characterization of
the testimony of plaintiff and the SLC employe witnesses is that although none could remember either the
specifics or the substance of any particular statement
made by any specific railroad representative, each could
remember certain specific things which were discussed
by those present at the meeting. None of the SLC employes kept any record or notes of this meeting. Each of
the SLC witnesses was thereupon allowed to state over
objection a conclusion reached by the witness that an
agreement had been reached between the railroads and
plaintiff, or at least that certain figures had been discussed to which the railroads made no objection. Both
of the railroad representatives denied unequivocally that
they had agreed on behalf of their respective railroads
to pay plaintiff any sums whatsoever at this meeting,
and no demand was made at the meeting that any sum be
paid to plaintiff by the railroads. The testimony was undisputed that neither of the railroad representatives had
7

actual authority to bind his respective railroad to pay
any sum of money to plaintiff. Mr. Gustin testified that
if he had thought that UP was being asked at the meeting to pay plaintiff any sum whatsoever he would have
initiated the normal contract procedures applied by UP,
but that he did not do so after the meeting because he
knew nothing of any such request at the meeting. (R
785-786, 796) (In UP's opinion a fair consideration of
all the testimony concerning the meeting of October 22,
1965 leads irresistibly and unquestionably to the conclusion that no mutual understanding was reached
thereat but that each person came to said meeting for
his own specific purpose different from the purpose of
the other participants, which separate specific purposes
were not clearly conveyed to the other participants, and
after a general discussion at the meeting each came away
satisfied that his purpose in coming had been fulfilled,
whereas as a matter of fact none of the participants
really understood the other.)
After the meeting plaintiff signed the contract
with SLC and entered into construction of the sewer ex·
tension, although it was already obligated by its bid and
bid bond to do so prior to the meeting. (Exhibit 1-P)
Plaintiff claimed that during construction it was de·
layed by the failure of UP to locate, expose, uncover and
protect certain cables which crossed the sewer line at
right angles in the vicinity of the removed railro.ad
tracks. Some of these cables ran to highway crossing s1g·
nals and others to railroad automatic block signals. (Ex·
hibit 52-D, R 660-665) The jury awarded plaintiff the
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full prayer of its claim against UP for $34.21 per foot
for 22 feet at each of six tracks, totalling $4,515.72, and
for
hours delay in the sum of $1,992.70. (R 122, 123,
204)

The foregoing is a brief background of the general
facts. To avoid repetition, other pertinent facts relating
to each of UP' s points on appeal will be stated (with
record designation) during the argument following.
(The court's attention is directed to the fact that
the numbering of the record on appeal on the transcript
of proceedings is not in consecutive sequence corresponding to the chronological sequence of the trial. The trial
began on .May 12 ( R 830-922), continued on May 13
(R 300-415), 14 (R 416-549), 15 (R 550-697), 18 (R
698-825), and concluded on May 19 (R 826-829, together with supplemental record and transcript of exceptions.)
ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In the following argument UP asserts in eight
separate points the grounds upon which the judgment
against UP should be reversed. Since the position of
D&RGW is not identical to UP's in many aspects of
this action, this argument will be directed only to the
judgment entered below against UP. Points V, VI and
\'III are directed principally to UP's contention that it
should be given judgment in accordance with its motions
9

for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict; Points II, III and IV are directed principally to UP's assertion that if it is not given final judgment in this matter at least it should be given a new trial,
and Points I and VII are directed principally to UP's
assertion that at the very least it is entitled to have the
delay portion of the judgment and interest thereon
stricken from the judgment.
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT WITH SLC PRECLUDES RECOVERY FROM UP FOR ANY
DAMAGE OCCASIONED BY DELAY IN LOCATING AND PROTECTING CABLES.
Plaintiff's contract with SLC for the construction
of sewer extension 933 (Exhibit 1-P) provided on page
18:
"PROPERTY LIABLE TO DAMAGE
5. The Contractor shall be liable for all damage

done to water, gas, steam or other pipes, ducts,
cables, flumes, poles, or conduits, or other property owned by any person or corporation other
than Salt Lake City." (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 1 (f) of the detail specifications at·
tached to the said contract provided on pages 2 and 3:
"(f) In this construction operation it
be
necessary to cross over or under existing
and public overhead and underground utility
lines, such as gas, water, sewer, power and tele·
10

phone cables, service laterals, etc. In all of these
crossings the contractor shall use extreme caution
and care so as not to damage or interfere with
of these services. Prior to his digging operation the contractor shall be required to notify
and contact all public utility agencies, whose lines
or property may be affected. Said notification
shall occur not less that forty-eight hours prior
to starting the work to allow them to have a representative at the site to assure protection to their
respective properties. Proper location of all facilities shall be determined prior to any digging
operation. In the event damage is done to any of
these facilities, due to the contractor's neglect or
the neglect of his agents, subcontractors or employees, the contractor shall be required to make
immediate repairs as required. The contractor
shall immediately report the damage done to the
prospective (sic) utility agency whose property
is affected so that proper permanent repair can
be made to their full satisfaction. All costs involved to repair or replace such damage done
shall be borne by the contractor and the City assumes no responsibility. See also paragraphs 5
and 5a, page 18, and paragraph 6, page 18 of the
contract, section I."
Clearly under the foregoing provisions of the plaintiff's contract with SLC, plaintiff was required to do
whatever was necessary to protect the cables leading to
railroad block signals and to highway crossing signals.
In spite of this clear language, plaintiff seeks to impose
on UP the expense arising from the time needed to locate, expose and protect those cables. Plaintiff attempted to justify its position on the ground that the cables
weren't shown on the plans and that it shouldn't be re-
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quired to expose and protect them. (R 524, 525) But
plaintiff's chief officer also stated that he knew there
would be cables at railroad tracks and all railroad tracks
were shown on the plans. (R 602, Exhibit 22-D) He also
stated that he had no problem with UP's cooperation in
attempting to locate and expose the railroad cables but
that they encountered some difficulty in finding them.
(R 599-603) An undetermined portion of the delay was ·
caused by hand digging around the cables after they had
been located and exposed (R 595-596, 605-606) and at
4th West an undetermined amount of delay was also
caused by the failure of D&RGW to timely remove its ,
rails. ( R 593)
By the plain terms of plaintiff's contract with SLC
it had not only a duty to protect UP' s cables but was
liable for any damage thereto. There can be no basis in
law for charging UP with the expense of delay encountered in the protection of said cables by exposure of
the same and hand-digging around them. (It is also cer·
tain that UP cannot be charged for D&RGW's failure
to remove its track, and the jury award to plaintiff of
the full amount of its delay claim at 4th West against
UP was clearly erroneous under the evidence.)
The case of Lundt vs. Parsons Construction Co.,
181 N eh. 609, 150 NW 2d 108, was an action for dam·
ages caused by the construction of a sanitary sewer
brought by a contractor who had already constructed a
storm sewer in the same street. The court held that the
storm sewer contractor was entitled to bring an action
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(lirectly against the sanitary sewer contractor and base
such action on the latter's contract for the construction
of a sanitary sewer with the City of Omaha. The court
sai<l that where the contract contains a promise to protect
existing utilities and other property and an agreement
lo repair damage caused by the construction, any party
whose property is damaged is entitled to bring an action
(lirectly against the construction company. A similiar result was reached in the case of Oman Construction Company vs. Tennessee Central Railway Company (Tenn.),
:l70 s w 2d 563.
The Utah court applies the same rule. In the case
of M. H. Walker Realty Company vs. American Surety
Company of New York, 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998, the
('ourt held that the owner of a building could enforce as
a third party beneficiary a contract between the building
company and an elevator company for installation and
of the elevator. To the same effect is Contenental Bank & Trust Company vs. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d
291 P. 2d 890.
In addition to the duty to protect UP's cables, plaintiff was precluded by its contract with SLC from recovering damage for delay. Paragraph 9 of that contract on
page 19 thereof provided:
"CLAIM FOR DAMAGE
9. The Contractor shall not be entitled to any
claim for damage on account of hindrance or dela v from anv cause whatever, but if occasioned by
ai:i:y act or
on the part of the City, such

13

hindrance or delay may entitle the Contractor ((1
an extension of time in which to complete the
work, which shall be determined by the Board of
Commissioners; provided, that the Contractor
shall give notice in writing of the cause of such
delay."
In view of the foregoing provisions of the SLC contract
and the foregoing law applicable thereto, plaintiff can·
not be entitled to damages from UP arising from any
alleged failure of UP to locate, expose and protect
cables in 9th South Street.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RE·
MOVE FROM JURY CONSIDERATION THE
ISSUE OF EXPRESS CONTRACT BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND UP AFTER PLAINTIFF .
DENIED FORMATION OF AN EXPRESS
AGREEMENT.
In Bunnell vs. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597,
this Honorable Court said:"A binding contract can exist 1
only where there has been mutual assent by the parties •
manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms,"
(citing Allen vs. Eissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226, 219 P.
539). The testimony of Byran Ewell, consequently,
should have removed the question of express contract
from this lawsuit for on page 564 of the record plaintiff
admitted that no one from either railroad agreed to pay
him any money in the following language read from Mr.
Ewell's deposition by Mr. Burton and Mr. Ewell:
1
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".Mr. HUR TON:*** 'Then neither Mr. Oatman or lVIr. Gustin agreed to pay you any amount
for laying corrugated metal pipe under the railroads after they had removed their tracks. They
just asked you what it would cost to have it done,
is that your testimony?'
A. I said. yes.

Q. And no one else on behalf of either of the
railroads ever agreed that they would pay you
that $34.21, did they?

A. I

Sal'd ,

'N O, Slr.
. '"

It is a principle of law well established by the Utah
r:ourts that a plaintiff is bound by the weakest part of his
testimony and that if such weakest link will not support
the issue in question, plaintiff is not entitled to go to the
jury on the issue covered by such testimony. This principle was stated in such language by this Honorable Court
in the case of Benson vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P. 2d 790, where
at page 45 of the Utah Reports and at page 795 of the
Pacific Reporter, the court quoted with approval Wheeler vs. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 63 F. 2d 562,
as follows:
" 'Where as in this case a party testifies in his
own behalf, he is not entitled to go to the jury on
an issue unless that portion of his own testimon;y
which is least favorable to his contention is of
such a character as will sustain a verdict in his
fa yor on that issue.' " (Emphasis by the Court.)
15

In view of the above testimony of Mr. Ewell, the
jury should not have been allowed to speculate upon the
issue of express contract and was erroneously permitted
to do so.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING
OVER OBJECTION INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE MATERIAL
FACTS IN ISSUE.
The court consistently during the trial allowed the
SLC officials over objection to express conclusory state·
men ts in aid of plaintiff's contention that it had a con·
tract with UP and D&RGW, for open-cutting railroad
crossings in 10 hours for extra pay, after each had ad·
mitted that he couldn't give the actual words or the sub·
stance of any statement made by any representative of
UP or D&RGW. For example, after Mr. Holmgren
stated that he couldn't say who said what, he was al·
lowed to state over objection his conclusion that when
the people left the first meeting they were going to con·
tact the contractor "for the purpose of coming to an
agreement between the railroads and the contractor."
(R 896-897) And plaintiff's counsel, after admonition
by the court to ask what conversation was had and the
gist of it, persisted in spite of repeated objection in ask·
ing Mr. Carter: "Did they ever agree verbally to those
terms?" (R 916) Mr. Carter was allowed to answer over
strenuous objection his conclusion of the conversation to
16

the effect that "it was my understanding that the railroads accepted it." (R 920) Likewise Mr. Fenton started to talk about his opinion of a "meeting of the minds"
(ll 357) and after an objection to that language had
been sustained, Mr. Fenton stated that "I can't remember specifically who said what." (R 359) At about this
time the UP was given a "continuing objection to any
questions of this witness that does not specifically identify the people involved." ( R 359) In spite of this continuing objection plaintiff's counsel persisted in asking leading questions without identifying railroad representatives involved, and eventually in spite of further
objection, Mr. Fenton was allowed to testify that he left
the meeting with the idea and understanding "that this
was agreed upon." (R 366-367) Mr. Keyting also testified that "I can't remember just exact discussion." Nor
''rery much" discussion at all about prices. (R 427)
Xevertheless, he also was allowed over objection to state
·'well, I had in my opinion was that they had come to
agreement if they needed any further agreement," and
"my opinion was that they were in accord .... " (R 428,
429)

This testimony of these SLC officials is not competent evidence of the existence of an agreement and
should not have been admitted, and was admitted over
the objection of defendant railroads. To support UP's
contention that this testimony is incompetent since is
amounts only to a conclusion of a lay witness concerning
the ultimate fact in dispute, the court's attention is directed to the following cases.
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In the case of Peerless l\!Ianufacturing Company vi.
Gates (Minn.) 63 NW 260, the court said: "The son of
the defendant was a witness on his behalf, and by his
counsel was asked the question: 'State whether your
father agreed to keep the machine, and did keep it, under
this agreement.' * * * Plaintiff objected to the question
as incompetent, which objection was overruled, and the
witness answered, 'He did.' This was error. The question
called for the mere conclusion of the witness.''
In the case of True Oil Company vs. Gibson
( 'Vyo.) 392 P. 2d 795, the question was whether or not
an oral or written agreement had been made between
Sinclair Oil & Gas Company and the plaintiff prior to
the expiration of a written lease. One John E. Dobos,
an attorney for the plaintiff, True Oil Company, testified that "he called Larkin O'Hern, District Landman
for Sinclair at Casper, on September 13, 1962, regarding the so-called discrepancies noted by True. He claimed that he and O'Hern 'agreed' the modifications proposed by True 'were in order.'" The court said that this
testimony was self-serving and hearsay and constituted
nothing more than the witness' conclusion as to what was
agreed. This was also a case wherein l\!lr. O'Hern had
no authority to agree to commit Sinclair to any agreement (compare Mr. Gustin's and Mr. Oatman's lack of
authority in the case before this court) . The court found
that there was no evidence that any agreement had been
made prior to the time Sinclair attempted to accept
True' s offer in writing which was after the expiration
of the underlying lease, holding that the testimony of
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plaintiff's attorney, quoted above, was clearly incompetent.
ln the case of Greenberg vs. Burnstein (1"10. App.),
347 S \ V 2d 244, the court held that the trial court properly sustained an objection to an inquiry from counsel
calling for a conclusion rather than for a specific conversation.
The rule as expressed in the foregoing cases from
other jurisdictions is followed by the Utah Supreme
Court. In the case of Farmers & Merchants Savings
Bank vs. Jensen, 64 Utah 609, 232 P. 1084, the court
held that the question asked which called for a conclusion of the witness as to what the other party had intended, was incompetent and should not have been allowed. The court said that accepting a question and answer which calls for a determination of the intent of the
other party to a conversation in a circumstance where
such intent is the crucial issue in the case is particularly
incompetent and prejudicial. Likewise in this case the
testimony of the SLC officials to the effect that it was
their understanding that defendant railroads and plaintiff had reached an agreement is clearly incompentent
because whether or not such agreement could be inferred from the conversation of the parties was the ultimate fact in issue and allowing those witnesses to express their conclusions thereon was clearly prejudicial.
In the case of Kimball Elevator vs. Elevator Supplies
Co., 2 Utah 2d 289, 272, P. 2d 583, the court found error
in the trial court's refusal to strike testimony of a non-
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party concerning a conversation with the defendant's
officer when the witness was testifying to impressions
rather than facts. The court said that it would have been
permissible for the witness to have recited the statements
of the defendant's officer or the substance of such statements, but that it was incompetent for the witness to
presume to say what defendant's officer had in his min<l
regarding the subject matter of the controversy. Likewise in this case it was incompetent for the SLC officials
to presume to say what UP's engineer had in his mind
regarding the subject matter of this controversy, to wit
-whether an agreement was being consummated by
conversation.
The court also allowed over objection of both railroad defendants parol evidence intended to vary plain·
tiff's written contracts, both with SLC and with the
D&RGW. (R 868-870 Catmull's conversation with
plaintiff and announcement at bid opening) (R 504,
505, 523, admission of Exhibits 44-P and 45-P also con·
taining self-serving conclusionary statements) In the
case of Western Engineers vs. State Road Commission,
20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P. 2d 216, the court held that plain·
tiffs were not entitled to introduce parol evidence to in·
dicate that delay was unreasonable or was not contem·
plated by the parties at time of execution of a contract
providing that plaintiff would prosecute the work con·
tinuously and diligently and that no charges or clai1n1
for damages would be made by plaintiffs for any delays
or hindrances of any cause whatsoever during the prog·
ress of the work. In the case at bar plaintiff entered into
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a similar contract with SLC (See Exhibit P-1 and particularly paragraphs 5, 8, 9 and 20 of the contract, and
paragraphs I(d), I(e) and I(f) of the detail specifications contained therein). Plaintiff was not entitled to
introduce parol evidence to vary the written terms of
said contract in order to allow plaintiff extra pay for
work done thereunder and admitting such evidence over
the objection of defendant railroads was clearly error
and highly prejudicial.
POINT IV
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS BOTH
CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE AND SEPARATELY PRECLUDED A FAIR TRIAL AND
VERDICT.
The lower court's instructions to the jury considered as a whole were contradictory, confusing and misleading. The court made no attempt to draft a comprehensive set of instructions to the jury adequately stating the law as applied to the issues in this case, but instead gave without change nearly all the requested instructions of each party and allowed the jury to pick
and choose, thereby violating one of the inherent concepts of a fair jury trial. Giving the jury instructions in
the order given by the court was particularly discriminatory against UP and confusing to the jury since those
of FP's requested instructions given by the court were
given first, then those of D&RGW and then for the
first time plaintiff's contentions were given as instruc-
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tion No. 26. (R 101-134) (R 150-200) This might have
been harmless error if the instructions taken as a whole
were not contradictory, but clearly instruction No. 33
( R 130) contradicted instruction No. II ( R 107), and
since the instructions favoring plaintiff came after No.
26, wherein the court first told the jury plaintiff's
theories of recovery, it made it appear that only those instructions favoring and requested by plaintiff had any
significance to this lawsuit. In addition specific instructions were erroneously given and ref used. UP requested
an instruction ( R 177) intended to make clear to the jury
that the evidence established that there was no actual
authority on the part of any UP representative to bind
l!P to an oral agreement. The court erroneously failed
to give this requested instruction but instead gave instruction No. 28 which failed to include the established
fact of lack of actual authority (R 125). The court also
erroneously gave instruction No. 29 (R 126) which pre·
supposed an act on the part of UP giving rise to an
estoppel to deny authority of its agent when there was
no evidence of any such act on the part of UP introduced at trial.
Instruction 33 given by the court also completely
misstates the requirements of the franchise agreements
in evidence in this case. (Exhibits 31-D through 36-D,
inclusive.) The duty imposed by these franchises is
not as broad as stated in said instruction and any additional duty would have to be imposed by the Public
Service Commission of Utah under Sections 54-4-15,
56-1-8 and 54-4-1, U.C.A., 1953, and the case of Provo
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City vs. The Department of Business Regulation, 118
Utah 1, 218 P. 2d 675, (as outlined in UP's original law
memorandum (R 86-88)), and this matter was never at
any time presented to the Public Service Commission.
Instruction No. 34 was clearly erroneous for the reasons
set forth in Point I above. Instructions No. 35 and No.
36 as given by the court (R 132, 133} also were erroneous in that there was no evidence of performance of
service by plaintiff on behalf of UP and no evidence of
any benefit to UP not already covered by plaintiff's contract with SLC. Instruction No. 37 (R 134) was also
erroneous in that it failed to distinguish between contract implied in law and in fact and there were no instructions given whereby the jury could determine such
distinction. All of the foregoing exceptions were duly
made by UP at the time of trial, (supplemental transcript and record on appeal), and UP was deprived of
a fair trial by the submission of the case to the jury on a
general verdict under the contradictory and confusing
instructions given by the court.
POINT V
THE ALLEGED CONTRACT BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND UP IS VOID AS AGAINST
PUBLIC POLICY.
Section 10-7-20, U.C.A., 1953, provides that all
contracts for city improvements exceeding a specified
sum must be made upon written competitive bids in accordance with the written plans and specifications set
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forth therein by the City. This project exceeded the
specified sum and was therefore subject to the provisions
of Section 10-7-20, U.C.A. 1953.
In accordance with that section, written plans and
specifications were made by SLC. None of those written
plans and specifications as so made even intimated that
persons bidding on the particular job in question would
be paid additional sums for the work covered by the
written plans and specifications. Streets Commissioner
Catmull testified that two of the bidders had come into
his office and asked for an interpretation of the letter
enclosed in the bid (Exhibits 6-P, 7-P) to the effect that
an open cut would be made through railroad tracks and
he testified that he had told those two potential contrac·
tors that the railroads would pay any extra cost involved
in going under the location of the removed railroad
tracks. (R 877, 878) Two of the bidders therefore obtained oral information contrary to the written plans
and specifications in respect to a very material matter
concerning the potential contract which information was
not given to nor possessed by the other bidders. Each of ,
these two were therefore given an undue advantage over
other potential bidders in violation of the competitive
bidding statute referred to above. Plaintiff was pre·
sumed to know the authority of the city to contract,
(Campbell Building Company vs. State Road Commission 95 Utah 242, 70 P. 2d 857) ; and since the city had
no authority to contract except upon written bids sub·
mitted in accordance with written plans and specifica·
tions in respect to the proposed project, plaintiff must
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rely for compensation strictly upon its contract with the
city. In the case of Huber & Rowland Construction Company vs. City of South Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 273, 323
258, the court said:
" ... in view of the great detail with respect to
which all of the requirements of the contract are
spelled out in over 50 pages of specifications, it
seems quite incredible that the parties would have
entirely overlooked such a substantial item as
the removal of the old sidewalk for which the
plaintiffs now sue for $3,245.20 additional compensation. If contractors such as plaintiffs can
make a competitive bid on a project, omitting
such a substantial item, then sue and recover on
quantum meruit, it is readily seen what havoc
could be wrought with the competitive bidding."
(Emphasis added.)
In this case before the court we have a clear illustration of how "havoc" can "be wrought with the competitive bidding." Two of the bids in this case (including
plaintiff's bid) ranged from $119,000 to $128,000 or an
average bid of $123,500. The other two bids ranged from
$166,000 to $198,000 or an average bid of $182,000. The
average of the two high bids was nearly 50 percent higher than the average of the two low bids. Can it be doubted that the understanding plaintiff had with Commissioner Catmull, to the effect that the railroads would pay
plaintiff "extra costs," lowered plaintiff's bid and gave
a competitive advantage over bidders who had no such
private information? .Mr. Ewell testified that he was
not worried about not obtaining a written contract with
the railroads nor about not contacting them concerning
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these "extra costs" because he relied on the city to help
him get the "extra costs" from the railroads that the city
(Commissioner Catmull) had promised him would be
paid by the railroads. ( R 604) And plaintiff's reliance
on the city officials was not misplaced for they did help
plaintiff obtain a favorable jury verdict in this case. UP
is entitled to invoke the prohibition of the competitive
bidding statute against this type of activity on the part
of SLC and plaintiff since "The principle that the law
will leave the situation where it finds it and not assist a
person to enforce or recover under a contract where a ·
contract is illegal or provides for the performance of •
an illegal act or is based on a consideration which is
itself illegal applies not only to the parties to the contract, but to all along the line who knowingly backed or
assured the performance or the doing of such illegal act."
Beaver County vs. Home Indemnity Company, 88 Utah ·
1, at p. 48, 52 P. 2d 435 at p. 455 and 456. And see also
Builders Supply Company vs. City of Helena, Montana, 154 P. 2d 270, wherein the court refused to allow
the purpose of the competitive bidding statute to be defeated although plaintiff claimed recovery on express ·
contract, on contract implied in law and on quantum
meruit, including unjust enrichment. The court said that
it could not provide any remedy, either in law or in
equity, where the result would be to defeat the purpose
of the legislature in passing the competitive bidding
statute.
Likewise in this case the court cannot provide plain·
tiff relief on its claims against UP when plaintiff did no
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labor and furnished no materials not already covered by
the bid prices on plaintiff's written contract with SLC
tntered into after competitve bidding. To allow relief
!:erein would allow SLC and plaintiff to violate with
impunity a statute designed to protect the public against
collusive and noncompetitive bidding on public contracts.
POINT VI
THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION MOVING TO UP FROM PLAINTIFF SUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGED CONTRACT.
SLC's contract with plaintiff (Exhibit 1-P) prorided in paragraph I of the stipulations that:
"I. The work embraced in and to be done under
this contract consists of the furnishing of all the
necessary materials, labor, tools, appliances and
equipment necessary for, or appurtenant to the
construction and satisfactory completion of all
the work herein specified, in accordance with the
plans, specifications, profiles, cross-sections and
other drawings on file in the Office of the City
Engineer, and as further detailed in Section 2 of
the specifications."

Paragraph I of the contract provided that:
"The prices named in the proposal attached
hereto are for the completed work, and include
the furnishing of all the materials, and all labor,
tools, equipment and appliances, and all expense,
direct or indirect, connected with the proper execution of the work, in accordance with the plans,
profiles, details and specifications for the work,
* * *,,
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And the first clause of the contract provided on p. 13 of
Exhibit 1-P that plaintiff would accept his bid price as
"full compensation" for the work.
Plaintiff's contract with SLC required him to perform each and every task that he performed in respect
to laying the sewer pipe along 9th South Street. The
court's attention is respectfully directed to the other provisions of Exhibit 1-P and particularly to Paragraphs
8, 14, 18 and 28 of the stipulations, Paragraphs 2, 9,
23e and 24 of the contract and Paragraphs I (a), I (b),
I ( c) , I ( d) , I ( e) , I ( f) and 4 (a) of the detail specifica·
tions thereof. All of these covered every phase of the'
work that plaintiff was required to do and all that plain·
tiff did in respect to UP tracks.

Insofar as UP is concerned, plaintiff performed no
labor and provided no materials not required by his written contract with SLC. Under these circumstances de- .
fendant UP was a third party beneficiary of plaintiff's
0
contract with SLC, was entitled to enforce the same un·
I'
der the cases heretofore cited under Point I, supra, and 1 ]
there was no independent consideration moving to UP
4
sufficient to support any express or implied agreement
by UP to pay for either laying pipe in the city street or
st
for delay.
r

Plaintiff's sole claim to independent consideration
in respect to its alleged agreement is its claim that the
railroads imposed a IO hour limitation for laying the
sewer pipe through each track location after the tracks
had been removed. (R 466) But it is clear from the evi·
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dence that this time limit concerned UP only in regard
to one track, the Provo Main, (R 784, 365, 424) and it
is also clear that this was a time limit self-imposed by
plaintiff ( R 469) upon request by UP in respect to one
track ( R 784, 365, 424) which amounted to nothing
more than compliance with plaintiff's duty under Paragraph 20 of its contract with SLC and under Paragraphs
I (d) and 1 ( e) of the detail specifications attached thereto. (Exhibits 1-P, 7-P)

Even if the court should conclude that UP was incidentally benefited by plaintiff's expedition in laying
' sewer pipe, such incidental benefit is not in and of itself
sufficient to require UP to make restiutition therefor.
See Baugh vs. Darley, ll2Utah1, 184 P. 2d 335. Plainliff was already bound to do the particular thing that it
:s claimed UP contracted for, namely, to lay the sewer
pipe with dispatch, and 10 hours was simply plaintiff's
standard of what constituted dispatch. The Utah cases
of Smith vs. Brown, 50 Utah 27, 165 P. 468; VanTassell
1·s. Lewis, ll8 Utah 356, 222 P. 2d 350, and Western
Engineers vs. State Road Commission, 20 Utah 2d 294,
437 P. 2d 216, hold unequivocally that the doing of an
act which a party is already obligated to do cannot constitute consideration for a new promise on the part of
another party.
1.

POINT VII
THE JURY'S AW ARD OF DAMAGES TO
PLAINTIFF BOTH FOR BREACH OF CON-
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TRACT AND FOR DELAY GIVES PLAIN.
TIFF UNJUSTIFIABLE DOUBLE RECO\'.
ERY.
l\Ir. Ewell testified that the price of $34.21 per
foot quoted by him was the price bid by plaintiff to SLC
for the construction contract. He stated he quoted that
price to defendant railroads on the basis that he would
get only half-production in those locations where railroad tracks were removed. (R 565, 575) His own testi·
mony and his work progress map admitted into evidence ,
are conclusive evidence that plaintiff obtained at least
this half-production on each of the days he claims delay ·
against UP. (R 596-599, Exhibit 50-P) Any such delay
therefore is included in the $34.21 price figure and plain· ·
tiff should not be allowed another recovery for delay in
addition thereto. Plaintiff's production on days it claim·
ed delays against UP also demonstrates conclusively
that none of such delays were in fact unreasonable.
As heretofore argued in Point I, all claims for de·
lay against UP should have been eliminated from this
case because of the provisions of plaintiff's written con·
tract with SLC compelling plaintiff to protect UP's
cables, but additionally such claims should also be elim·
inated if plaintiff is otherwise entitled to recover on its
alleged agreement with UP, since such agreement would
undoubtedly have taken into account any delay occa·
sioned by the presence of UP cables in the street. Since
the jury verdict is for the full amount claimed under the
alleged contract and also for the full amount claimed for
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Jelay, plaintiff was given double recovery on its claims
against UP and the portion of the judgment relating to
delay should be stricken from the judgment.

POINT VIII
AFTER ELIMINATION OF INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE AND THE DELAY
CLAIMS, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ANY JUDGMENT
AGAINST UP.
As heretofore argued in Point I, the claims for delay should be eliminated from this lawsuit because of
plaintiff's contract with the city. And Point II effectively disposes of plaintiff's contention that any contract was
made on express assent by the railroads. The only factual issues remaining are whether or not under the evidence a contract may be implied in fact from conduct or
implied in law upon a quantum meruit theory. When
the incompetent evidence is removed from this case as
set forth in Point III above there is really insufficient
evidence remaining to justify a judgment against UP.
This is particularly true because of the added burden
placed upon a person attempting to establish an implied
contract. This court has heretofore stated in McColl um
Ys. Clothier, 121 Utah 311,241 P.2d 468, "The law
should not require everyone to keep on guard . . . by
warning persons offering services that no pay is to be expected. It is, therefore, essential that the court should
exercise caution in imposing the obligations of implied
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contract, as contrasted to express contract, where the
parties have actually defined and agreed to the terms
they are to be found (sic) by." (Emphasis added.)
Material to the question of whether such implied
contract may be found against UP in this case is Mr.
Ewell's testimony to the effect that he never demanded
that either of the railroads pay the alleged contract price .
at the meeting of October 22, 1965. (R 481-482) Plaintiff's counsel introduced much testimony to the effect
that the railroads did not object to any figures quoted,
and to the effect that they did not say they would not '
pay, but there was absolutely no evidence introduced
that either railroad was ever asked to pay plaintiff any
amount at said meeting. Apparently plaintiff and the,
SLC officials assumed that the railroads were aware of
plaintiff's position that he was entitled to extra pay from
the railroads in addition to his contract price with SLC
for open cut, but nothing in the evidence of what took ;
place prior to the meeting with the contractor would
have led UP to any conclusion in respect to its obligation
except that it might be required to do some work with its
own forces so that plaintiff could open cut without the,
physicial presence of railroad tracks at the sewer-rail·
road crossings. As soon as an unequivocal demand was
made upon UP by plaintiff for payment under the al·
leged contract (Exhibit 43-P), UP responded promptly
and forcefully that it had no contract with plaintiff,
written or implied. (Exhibit 41-P) The plaintiff's proof,
(eliminating the incompetent evidence hereinabove set
forth), thus fell far short of meeting its burden to prore
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implied contract. Obviously in the construction of a
sewer line underneath thirteen sets of railroad tracks,
therewill be construction problems which must be discussed between the contractor, the city and the railroads.
1f the railroads cannot go to a meeting with the other
interested parties and enter into a general discusssion of
the construction problems without running the risk of
later assertion of an implied contract to pay sums of
money to a contractor, cooperation in planning, programming and constructing needed public improvements in the vicinity of railroad tracks will be seriously
impeded. The city was aware of UP's contracting practices and knew that a writing was required by UP of
agreements, although under emergency conditions UP
on one occasion let SLC on UP right of way without a
formal writing upon authorization of UP's General
Manager. (R 382-383) However, that authorization did
not involve payment by UP of any sum to a third party,
but only the use of its own forces. (R 410) Certainly
without a demand at the October meeting that UP pay
plaintiff in accordance with the price quoted, UP cannot
be held to have entered into a contract implied by conduct, for UP, under McCollum vs. Clothier, supra, had
no duty to warn plaintiff that no pay was to be expected.
And as explained in Point VI above there was no benefit to UP sufficient to warrant recovery upon quantum
meruit.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the argument abon,
UP is entitled to the relief requested on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
A. U. MINER
D.A.BYBEE
N. W. KETTNER
S. A. GOODSELL
J.C. WILLIAMS
Counsel for Union Pacific Railrod
Company, Defendant-Appellant
10 South Main Street,

Salt Lake City, Utah
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